In a smart city, real-time tra c sensors may be deployed for various applications, such as route planning. Unfortunately, sensors are prone to failures, which result in erroneous tra c data. Erroneous data can adversely a ect applications such as route planning, and can cause increased travel time. To minimize the impact of sensor failures, we must detect them promptly and accurately. However, typical detection algorithms may lead to a large number of false positives (i.e., false alarms) and false negatives (i.e., missed detections), which can result in suboptimal route planning. In this paper, we devise an e ective detector for identifying faulty tra c sensors using a prediction model based on Gaussian Processes. Further, we present an approach for computing the optimal parameters of the detector which minimize losses due to false-positive and falsenegative errors. We also characterize critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the route planning application. Finally, we implement our method and evaluate it numerically using a realworld dataset and the route planning platform OpenTripPlanner.
INTRODUCTION
In smart cities, real-time tra c sensors may be deployed for various applications. However, sensors are prone to failures, which result in erroneous tra c data. Erroneous data can adversely a ect the performance of applications. To minimize the impact of sensor failures, we must detect them promptly and with high accuracy. However, typical detection algorithms may lead to a large number of false positives and false negatives, which can result in suboptimal performance.
Anomaly detection of faulty tra c sensors has been studied in the literature. Typical approaches include using data-driven methods that incorporate historical and real-time data to detect anomalies [10] , [18] , [14] , [16] . However, existing approaches may result in high performance-losses in tra c applications, mainly due to false-positive (FP) and false-negative (FN) errors. In order to minimize the losses, it is desirable to reduce the FP and FN rates as much as possible. But, there exists a trade-o between them, which can be changed through a detection threshold. To address this, it is necessary to take into account the tra c application when designing anomaly detectors, and quantify the losses in the tra c application caused by the FP and FN errors. By selecting the right detection threshold, the performance losses caused by FPs and FNs can be minimized.
In this paper, we study the problem of nding optimal thresholds for anomaly detection of faulty tra c sensors, considering route planning as the application of interest. The objective is to select the optimal thresholds of anomaly detectors in order to optimize the performance of the route planning application in the presence of faulty sensors. We devise an e ective detector for identifying faulty tra c sensors using a prediction model based on Gaussian Processes. Further, we present an approach for computing the optimal parameters of the detector which minimize losses due to false-positive and false-negative errors. We also characterize critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the tra c application. Finally, we implement our method and evaluate it numerically using a real-world dataset and the route planning platform Open-TripPlanner [11] . Our evaluation results show that the proposed strategy successfully minimizes the performance loss and identi es the critical sensors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the background for route planning and Gaussian Process regression. In Section 3, we introduce the system model. In Section 4, we de ne a notion of optimal detection, present a method to obtain near-optimal thresholds, and de ne critical sensors. In Section 5, we implement our method and evaluate it numerically. In Section 6, we discuss related work. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Route Planning
Let G = (V , E) be a directed graph with a set V of vertices and a set E of arcs. Each arc (u, ) ∈ E has an associated nonnegative cost c(u, ). The cost (i.e., length) of a path is the sum of the costs of its arcs. In the point-to-point shortest path problem, one is given as input the graph G, a query q = (o, d), where o ∈ V is an origin and d ∈ V is a destination, and the objective is to nd a minimum-cost (i.e., shortest) path from o to d in G. In the many-to-many shortest path problem, a set of queries Q is given, and the goal is to nd the minimum-cost path for each query q = (o, d) ∈ Q.
There exist many route planning algorithms that compute optimal solutions in an e cient manner [1] . Among these methods, the bidirectional Dijkstra's algorithm with binary heaps computes point-to-point shortest path in O(|E| + |V | log |V |). Further, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm solves all pairs shortest paths in O(|V | 3 ). A large number of methods have been designed to improve running time of shortest-path algorithms. For example, contraction hierarchies and arc ags have been successfully used [3] .
Gaussian Process Regression
GPs provide a Bayesian paradigm to learn an implicit functional relationship = f (x) from a training dataset {(x i , i ); i = 1, 2, ..., n}, where x i ∈ R d represents the vector of observed input variables (i.e., predictors), and i is the observed target value. A comprehensive discussion of GPs in machine learning can be found in [13] .
GPs directly elicit a prior distribution on the function f (x), and assume it to be a GP a priori,
For a new point x * , the goal is to predict * = f (x * ). Given that the regression function is a GP, the distribution of the values of f at any nite number of points is a multivariate Gaussian distribution. Therefore, * ∼ N µ(x),
where K is the covariance matrix for the labeled points, K * is the covariance vector between the new point and the labeled points, and K * * is the measurement noise. Then,
The prediction of a GP model depends on the choice of covariance function, which identi es the expected correlation between the observed data. Typically, a parametric family of functions is used, and the hyperparameters are inferred from the data. Examples of the commonly used covariance functions include polynomial kernel, automatic relevance determination (ARD), and radial basis function (RBF). Methods for learning the hyperparameters are based on maximization of the marginal likelihood, which can be performed using gradient-based optimization algorithms.
SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the system model. We rst de ne a model of transportation network. Then, we construct a detector for identifying faulty tra c sensors using a prediction model based on Gaussian Processes.
Transportation Network
Consider a transportation network modeled as a graph G = (V , E), where edges represent road segments and vertices represent connections between road segments (e.g., tra c junctions). We assume that a subset S ⊆ E of the road segments are monitored by sensors that measure tra c state (e.g., speed, occupancy, ow) at discrete timesteps k ∈ N. The measurements of these sensors are transmitted to a navigation service, which given a set of queries Q(k) at timestep k, computes the corresponding shortest paths. For segments without a tra c sensor, we assume the navigation service uses either previously computed values or predicted values using measurements of adjacent sensors.
Tra c sensors may be faulty due to miscalibration or hardware failure. If a sensor s ∈ S is faulty, there is a discrepancy between the actual and measured values. In other words, if a s (k) is the actual value and m s (k) is the measured value of faulty sensor s, then
In this model, we do not consider faults that result in no data being sent, since such cases can easily be ltered out by an operator.
Gaussian Process-Based Detector
Given the sensor measurements, we need to decide whether some sensors are faulty. We assume that the number of sensors that simultaneously become faulty is low, which is true in practice. As a result, for any sensor, the majority of nearby sensors that have not been marked faulty provide reliable tra c data, and so we can use these nearby sensors to predict the value measured by the sensor in question. To detect faults, we then compare the predictions to the measurements, and if there is a signi cant di erence between the predicted values and the received measurements, an alarm indicating presence of a fault in that particular sensor is triggered.
Tra ic Prediction.
As our tra c predictor, we use GPs, which is a kernel-based machine learning method. Kernel-based methods have gained special attention for tra c prediction because of their generalization capability and superior nonlinear approximation. Among di erent kernel-based methods, previous work shows that GPs outperform other methods such as ARIMA and neural networks [17] . We use GPs because in addition to the above advantages, it allows for explicit probabilistic interpretation of forecasting outputs.
As the kernel function, we decide for the commonly used ARD squared exponential,
where m(k) and m(k) are vectors of measurements, and σ f and
We let the target variable be the predicted tra c value p s (e.g., tra c ow or occupancy) of sensor s ∈ S at timestep k. Further, we let the predictor variables be the measured tra c values of other sensors at the same timestep. In practice, two sensors are highly correlated if they are in close proximity. Therefore, it is possible to select predictor variables as the measured values of d closest sensors from the target sensor, where the choice of d depends on the network structure. This way, the predicted tra c value is de ned
Detection Algorithm.
We can e ciently detect failures for each sensor s ∈ S, by comparing the measured tra c value m s (k) with the predicted tra c value p s (k). We use Cumulative sum control chart (CUSUM) as the detection algorithm, which is a sequential analysis technique typically used for monitoring change detection [12] .
Consider sensor s ∈ S, with a sequence of measurements m s (1), ..., m s (k) and corresponding tra c predictions with means p s (1), ..., p s (k) and standard deviations σ s (1), ..., σ s (k). The standardized residual signal is de ned as
Moreover, upper and lower cumulative sums are de ned as,
where U s (k) = L s (k) = 0 for k = 1, and b s is a small constant. Denoting the detection threshold at timestep k by η s (k), a measurement sequence violates the CUSUM criterion at the sample
Formally, letting H 0 and H 1 be the null and fault hypothesis, the decision rule is described by
False-Negative and False-Positive
Trade-o . In anomaly detectors, there might be a false negative, which means failing to raise an alarm when a fault did happen. Further, there might be a false positive, which means raising an alarm when the sensor exhibits normal behavior. It is desirable to reduce the FP and FN probabilities as much as possible. But, there exists a trade-o between them, which can be controlled by changing the threshold. In particular, by decreasing (increasing) the threshold, one can decrease (increase) the FN probability and increase (decrease) the FP probability.
We represent the FN probability for each sensor s by the function FN s : R + → [0, 1], where FN s (η s (k)) is the probability of FN when the threshold is η s (k), given that the sensor is faulty. Similarly, we denote the attainable FP probability for each sensor s by FP s : R + → [0, 1], where FP s (η s (k)) is the FP probability when the threshold is η s (k), given that the sensor is in normal operation. It is possible to plot the FP probability as a function of the FN probability for various threshold values [5] (e.g., see Figure 3 ).
OPTIMAL DETECTION
In this section, we formulate the problem of nding optimal thresholds for anomaly detection of tra c sensors, considering route planning as their primary application. The objective is to select the optimal thresholds for anomaly detectors in order to minimize the losses caused by false positives and false negatives. Then, we present an algorithm to nd near-optimal detection thresholds. Finally, we characterize critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the tra c application.
Optimization Problem
First, consider the set of queries Q, and a route planning algorithm that takes as inputs the set of queries and the measured and predicted tra c values, and outputs the optimal routes. For a single query q ∈ Q and sensor s ∈ S, we denote by P q (m s ) the optimal route computed using the measured tra c values for all sensors, and we denote by P q (p s ) the optimal route using the predicted value p s for sensor s and the measured values m −s for all other sensors. Finally, for a given route r and sensor s, let T (r, m s ) and T (r , p s ) be the total travel time based on the measured m s and predicted p s values for sensor s, respectively, and the measured values m −s for all other sensors.
Then, T P q (p s ), m s is the measured travel time of the shortest route computed using the predicted value p s for sensor s. Similarly, T P q (m s ), m s is the measured travel time of the shortest route computed using the measured value m s . We de ne the loss caused by a false positive as follows:
that is, the di erence in measured travel time between using either the predicted or the measured value for sensor s. The rationale behind the above expression is the following. In case of a FP, according to the detector, the measured value m s is incorrect, but it is actually correct. Consequently, we choose a route that is computed using our prediction p s instead of the optimal route, which would be computed using the measurement m s . To quantify the loss, we need to compare the travel times of the two routes, and we must use the measured tra c value m s for this comparison since that is the correct value in this case.
Similarly, for a FN, T P q (m s ), p s is the predicted travel time of the shortest route using measured value m s , and T P q (p s ), p s is the predicted travel time of the shortest path using predicted value p s . The loss caused by a FN is
that is, the di erence in predicted travel time between using either the measured or the predicted value for sensor s. Note that in (9) and (10), the values of P and T can be computed using existing route planning algorithms [1] . Next, let FP s (η s (k)) and FN s (η s (k)) be the probabilities of falsepositive and false-negative errors when detection threshold η s (k) is selected. Further, let p f be the probability of fault, and let p n = 1−p f be the probability of normal operation. For a given query q, the total loss caused by FPs and FNs is, Considering the set of all queries Q, the total loss is
which allows us to de ne the notion of optimal detection threshold for a sensor.
De nition 4.1 (Optimal Detection). The detection threshold η * s (k) is optimal for sensor s if it minimizes the loss function (12) . Formally, Figure 1 shows the ow of information in our approach. At each timestep k, given measurements m(k), the predictor computes the predicted measurements p(k). Then, given a set of queries Q(k), and the predictions and measurements, the thresholds η(k) are computed for the detectors using the algorithm presented next.
Algorithm for Obtaining Thresholds
We present Algorithm 1 to nd near-optimal detection thresholds. The algorithm implements a random-restart hill climbing technique. If the FP to FN trade-o curve is convex, which makes (12) convex, we are able to compute optimal thresholds using convex optimization methods. However, this is not generally the case, as trade-o curves tend to be non-convex (see Figure 3 for an instance of a trade-o curve).
The algorithm considers each sensor separately, and nds its corresponding detection threshold. At each iteration, the algorithm selects a new starting point and nds a local minimum using gradientbased optimization. In order to avoid unnecessary computation, we skip computing detection thresholds for sensors with very similar measured and predicted tra c values. Formally, for sensor s ∈ E, we select detection threshold η s = ∞, if |z s (k)| < b. This is because the detector's statistics U s (k) and L s (k) are decreasing and it is unlikely that an alert would be raised if one was not raised before.
Critical Sensors
Value of the optimal loss gives insight on the criticality of tra c sensors. Fault on a sensor that has high loss value degrades the system's performance more than fault on a sensor with low loss value. We formally de ne the set of δ -critical sensors below.
De nition 4.2 (Critical Sensors). Set of δ -critical sensors in a time period [1,T ] is de ned as the set of sensors which have the average optimal loss values of greater than or equal to δ . That is to say, a sensor s is critical if 1 i ← i + 1 17: return η * Identifying critical sensors is bene cial, since it allows us to locate the most vulnerable elements of a network, which should be strengthened rst to increase the robustness of a network. For example, if we have a limited budget which permits us to replace only a subset of the sensors with more robust ones, then we should start with the critical sensors.
EVALUATION
In this section, we implement our method and evaluate it numerically using a route planning platform.
System Model

Tra ic Data.
We use a tra c dataset obtained from the Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS) database [2] . The database provides real-time and historical tra c data from over 39,000 individual sensors, which span the freeway system across metropolitan areas of the State of California. Figure 2 shows the location of sensors in our case study, in which a total of 40 sensors are considered. We use the 5-minute aggregated data collected on the weekdays of September 3, 2016 to September 17, 2016. The dataset contains 115,200 data points. The rst 7 days are used as training data, and the remaining 7 days are used as test data.
To simulate faults, we use models for a speci c set of fault types and ranges of fault magnitudes, which is similar to the approach presented in [16] . The fault models are: 1) Constant Relative Overcount (caused by e.g., unsuitable sensitivity levels); range: 3% to 7% of the actual values (i.e., ε s (k) = u s a s (k) where 0.03 ≤ u s ≤ 0.07), 2) Conditional Undercount (caused by e.g., sensor saturation); range: 7% to 13% (i.e., ε s (k) = u s a s (k) where −0.13 ≤ u s ≤ −0.07).
Next, for each sensor, we construct a predictor using the measurements of its d closest sensors as the predictor variables. We select d = 10 since it results in the minimum overall prediction error. We choose b s = 0.05 for all the detectors, to make them sensitive to small shifts in the mean. We evaluate each detector's performance by plotting the FP probability against the FN probability at various threshold values. Figure 3 shows the trade-o curve of the detector implemented for a sensor, whose identi er in the PeMS dataset is VDS 774685.
Route
Planner. We use OpenTripPlanner (OTP), which is an open source platform for multi-modal route planning [11] .
OTP relies on open data standards including OpenStreetMap for street networks. The default routing algorithm in OTP is the A * algorithm with a cost-heuristic to prune the search. For improved performance on large networks, it also uses contraction hierarchies.
Results
We simulate a route planning scenario in OTP, where the edge costs (i.e., travel times) are updated using our tra c data. For a source and destination as shown in Figure 4a , we consider 1000 queries made on September 15, from 9:00 am to 10:00 am. Figure 4a shows the shortest route when a particular sensor (i.e., VDS 774685) is healthy, and Figure 4b shows the shortest route when the same sensor has a conditional undercount fault. Note that if the fault remains undetected (i.e., false negative), a suboptimal route (Figure 4b ) will be selected instead of the optimal route (Figure 4a ). In another scenario, assume an alarm is triggered under normal operation (i.e., false positive). This means that the predicted value is used for route planning instead of the accurate measurement value, which depending on the prediction accuracy, may result in a suboptimal route planning solution. We use Algorithm 1 to nd near-optimal thresholds that minimize losses due to FPs and FNs. We assume that for each sensor, the probability of fault is p f = 0.05. For the previously considered sensor, at k = 1 (i.e., from 9:00 am to 9:05 am), the loss value (12) as a function of the threshold is shown in Figure 5 . In this case, Algorithm 1 nds the optimal thresholds. For the Conditional Undercount, the optimal threshold and the minimum loss are η = 0.17 and L = 16.2, whereas for the Constant Relative Overcount, the optimal threshold and the minimum loss are η = 0.39 and L = 30.0.
Further, Table 1 shows the average optimal loss for some sensors, i.e., 1
. As a baseline, we also compute the minimum loss when the thresholds have static values at all the timesteps. That is, for all k, we assign η s (k) = η * s , where η * s ∈ argmin η s k L s (η s , Q). We observe that our method achieves signi cantly smaller losses compared the static case. The loss values can also be used to identify the set of δ -critical sensors. For example, 50.0-critical sensors are made bold in the table.
RELATED WORK
There are many papers that study tra c prediction. The work in [9] uses multivariate kernel regression models to predict tra c ow in [4] , the paper provides a travel time prediction algorithm in a small scale simulated network. The work in [15] constructs robust algorithms for short-term tra c ow prediction. Finally, in [7] , classical time series approaches are used for short-term speed prediction in a network. The problem of anomaly detection of tra c sensors is reviewed in [10] . The paper categorizes di erent methods into the three levels of macroscopic, mesoscopic, and microscopic, and provides practical guidelines for anomaly detection. The work in [18] presents three methods to detect faulty tra c measurements. The methods are based on Pearson's correlation, cross-correlation, and multivariate ARIMA. Finally, the work in [14] presents a test, which is based on the relationship between ows at adjacent sensors to detect faulty loop detectors. Nevertheless, since previous papers use static thresholds, their methods result in high losses due to FPs and FNs.
In our previous work, we have considered the problem of optimal parameter selection for anomaly detection. The problem of nding optimal thresholds for intrusion detectors is studied in [8] . The paper shows that computing optimal attacks and defenses is computationally expensive, and proposes heuristic algorithms for computing near-optimal strategies. Further, the work in [6] studies the problem of nding optimal thresholds for anomaly-based detectors implemented in dynamical systems in the face of strategic attacks. The paper provides algorithms to compute optimal thresholds that minimize losses considering best-response attacks.
CONCLUSIONS
We studied the problem of nding optimal detection parameters for anomaly detection of tra c sensors, considering route planning as application. We constructed a predictor using Gaussian processes, which was then used for anomaly detection. We studied how to nd the optimal detection parameters, which minimize losses due to FP and FN errors. We also characterized critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the tra c application. We implemented our method and evaluated it numerically using a route-planning platform. Our evaluations indicated that the proposed detection method successfully minimizes the performance losses.
